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I. Introduction
Somalia is still in a protracted political limbo as it enters its fifteenth 
year of “statelessness.”2 Despite the precarious situation of Somali ref-
ugees scattered across many parts of the world, both the country and 
the plight of its refugees remain off the radar of the world media. The 
atrocities committed in the process of the overthrow of Siyaad Barre’s 
regime in 1991, and the clanistic power struggles that followed, led to 
the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Somalis. The refugees 
initially fled to the neighboring countries of Ethiopia, Djibouti, and 
Kenya, subsequently moving on to countries near and far. Those who 
were fortunate enough to escape the trials and tribulations inherent in 
exile in countries such as Kenya, where existing resources are barely 
able to meet the basic needs of the native population and where most 
refugees still remain in closed camps, moved on to more prosperous 
countries where they obtained refugee status. Most were not so fortu-
nate, however.3
The focus of this essay is the approximately 130,000 Somali refu-
gees who remain in limbo in camps in the North Eastern Province 
of Kenya (NEP).4 Dadaab, a name given to three camps (Hagadera, 
Ifo, and Dhagahley), is located about 100 kilometers from the Somali-
Kenya border. These camps were created in mid-1992, after it became 
almost impossible for the international humanitarian regime to run the 
camps in Liboi, a border region too close to southern Somalia, where 
violence still occurred on a daily basis. Security concerns for interna-
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tional staff, refugees, and humanitarian supplies all led to the creation 
of new camps further inside Kenyan territory. The region where the 
Dadaab camps are located is semi-arid and was sparsely populated 
by nomadic Somali-Kenyans before the arrival of refugees fleeing the 
war. There have been hostilities between Kenya and Somalia ever since 
independence in the early 1960s, the latter claiming the Somali-inhab-
ited Northern Frontier District (NFD) as a missing Somali territory and 
supporting regional independence movements. Due to this tension, 
Kenya kept the NFD, now known as the Northeastern Province of 
Kenya, and its population under a permanent state of emergency from 
independence until 1992.5
The scale of refugee flight across the Kenyan border in the early 
1990s overwhelmed both the small local nomadic population and the 
scarce natural resources of the area. The presence of international orga-
nizations nevertheless brought this previously marginalized region 
some attention with the provision of services such as boreholes, hos-
pitals, and schools. By March 2003, about 160,000 of the more than 
400,000 Somali refugees who fled to Kenya at the height of the war 
remained there. Of these, 130,000 were in the three Dadaab camps, 
with smaller numbers in the Kakuma camps in Northwestern Kenya, 
and the remainder living in urban centers like Nairobi. The United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) administers the 
camps, with CARE responsible for social services, the World Food Pro-
gram (WFP) for food, and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) for health 
care.6
This study examines the roles and responsibilities of those charged 
with caring for refugees in camps in Somalia’s neighboring countries. 
The argument here is that encampment and protracted refugee situ-
ations leave thousands of men, women, and children living in limbo, 
resulting in wasted human capacity and acute diminution of human 
dignity. Research in Dadaab found that refugees are dismayed by their 
dependency on inadequate aid and express the loss of a sense of self-
worth due to their inability to better their situation or to escape from 
the dire conditions of camp life. The failure of the host state and the 
international community to bring about any effective intervention to 
free refugees from such a condition is also examined. Here, the empha-
sis is on the neglect of the Kenyan Government, as a signatory state to 
many human rights and refugee covenants, to enforce the refugees’ 
legal rights under international law. Any positive and proactive com-
mitment on the part of this Government, I suggest, would have gone a 
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long way to alleviate the refugees’ predicament. Finally, I submit that 
the international refugee regime’s mantra of durable solutions—rein-
tegration, resettlement, and repatriation—as the only viable options 
often translates to no solution and only leads to a protracted condition, 
as demonstrated by the situation in which refugees find themselves. 
Refusal to explore other options for addressing the refugee crisis (other 
than basic maintenance) has devastating consequences for displaced 
populations.
II. Encampment: Dependency, Deprivations, and Refugee “Persona”
Humanitarian organizations, upon their arrival in disaster zones, 
rarely have the luxury to assess whether camps are the best option to 
address human catastrophes.7 Once camps are created, however, the 
transit that was initially hoped for often turns out to have been wish-
ful thinking, as shown by the many cases of protracted refugee situa-
tions in the last two decades.8 Examples of refugees in limbo for over 
a decade include “Tigrayans and Eritreans in Sudan, Afghans in Paki-
stan and Iran, Salvadorians in Honduras, Cambodians and Laotians in 
Thailand, Mozambicans in Malawi, Angolans in Zaire, and Vietnam-
ese boat people in different countries in Southeast Asia.”9 One should 
add Rwandans in Tanzania and Somalis in Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, 
and Yemen. On paper, the UNHCR claims that, “the establishment of 
refugee camps must be only a last resort. A solution that maintains and 
fosters the self-reliance of the refugees is always preferable.”10 Nev-
ertheless, camps become the first choice to “manage” a refugee crisis. 
Certainly difficulties abound for the humanitarian community in man-
aging and assisting people dispersed over a vast area in emergency 
situations; yet, as I will demonstrate, falling back on camps as the only 
solution for the administration of humanitarian assistance means turn-
ing a blind eye on the short-term and long-term detrimental effects on 
refugees.
Camps are often established in peripheral regions, which leads 
to segregation and marginalization of refugees.11 The international 
humanitarian organizations administering these camps have different 
cultural norms, linguistic backgrounds, and political concerns than 
the people under their care. To be sure, refugees in the crisis phase 
welcome the assistance strangers bestow upon them and remain acqui-
escent to camp regimentation. However, once the emergency period 
passes, with camps entering a maintenance phase, refugees experi-
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ence few changes in the routines of scheduled ration distributions, 
head counts, and visits of international dignitaries. Resentment and 
conflict with the aid apparatus follows.12 Aggravating these inadequa-
cies further is the prohibition of freedom of movement to which refu-
gees in closed camps are subjected, a constraint that greatly hampers 
the ability to seek alternative livelihood strategies outside the camps. 
Coupled with the difficulties international humanitarian organizations 
experience in raising sufficient funds to administer the camps with 
adequate provisions beyond the emergency phase, this renders the 
camps domains of high material scarcity.
Arguments against this type of encampment include that camps 
engender passivity, breaking down all initiative and sense of self-worth of 
refugees. The hand-to-mouth arrangement of waiting for others to pro-
vide for one’s needs eventually translates to complete dependency on 
donations.13 However, while acknowledging the importance of these 
rations for refugees whose other options are constrained both by the 
environment of camp locations and national laws prohibiting or limit-
ing employment prospects, some researchers contest this “dependency 
syndrome.”14 Instead, Kibreab, using Somali-Ethiopian refugees in 
Somalia in the 1970s and 1980s as an example, writes:
[t]he majority of refugees in the camps were willing to expend their 
labour on economic activities, often for very small return, and also, in 
some cases, to take the risk of relinquishing their ration cards for the 
uncertain alternative of self-sufficiency. Among the able bodied refugees, 
there was no evidence at all that the refugees’ willingness to take initia-
tives and to work hard either to earn an income or to augment their diet 
was negatively affected by prolonged dependency on handouts.15
Clark also refutes the concept of a dependency syndrome. Instead, he 
asserts that, “the apparent dependency of refugees derives from their 
removal from their social, political and economic coping systems.”16 
While dependency is acknowledged, the reasons refugees may become 
dependent are contested: instead of “laziness” or “welfare mentality,” 
this argument partly points to the structural constraints inherent in 
camp life, equated with Goffmanesque “total institutions.”17 Despite 
the different rationales for dependency, a consensus exists within the 
scholarly literature about the suffering of refugees in “closed camps,” 
who live in limbo and rely on dwindling rations for years on end. Due 
to the disruption of refugees’ social and economic networks, long-term 
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encampment further negatively impacts the future reintegration of ref-
ugees into their home countries.18
Research among Afghanis in Pakistan found that more than the 
social dislocation of being outside of their home country, “what is 
disruptive and potentially most threatening to Pashtun refugees is not 
social dislocation so much as the contradictions posed by the framing 
experience of becoming—in multiple senses of the word—refugees.”19 
This last finding emphasizes the disempowerment that refugees expe-
rience when they no longer toil on their land or survive by their sweat 
but wait around for food distribution, perceived as nonreciprocal char-
ity bestowed upon them. Acceptance of these donations is perceived 
as being contradictory to the Pashtun culture. Also, research among 
Vietnamese refugees in Southeast Asian camps demonstrates that even 
more than the enclosure and fences surrounding the camps, what is 
most damaging about closed camps is the uncertainty of the refugees’ 
prospects for leaving the camps and the camp administration’s expec-
tation for refugees to represent themselves as “helpless supplicants 
under suspicion.”20
Data collected from Somalis in Dadaab confirms the deprivations 
refugees experience in protracted situations. Interviewees detailed the 
precariousness of their day-to-day existence, which is, unfortunately, 
substantiated by camp administration reports. For example, WFP 
often raises alarm bells about the impending starvation of refugees in 
Dadaab or in Kenya. The food WFP is able to secure always falls short 
of the daily caloric requirement, with both the quantity and quality of 
rations falling short. Refugees expressed to this author their frustration 
with the situation. Foodstuffs distributed are actually often scorned. 
Many argued that the quality of the grains distributed is “not fit for 
humans.” Moreover, most research participants dwelled on the lack of 
variety in their rations and the cultural inappropriateness of maize as 
the main staple provided. “The food distributed per person has now 
been reduced to three kilograms of maize per person per fortnight” is a 
statement that was reiterated by all. Flour, a staple most Somalis utilize 
to prepare laxoox (flat bread), is rarely found in their bimonthly rations. 
By the end of my first visit to Dadaab, in August 2001, refugees had 
not received flour for almost a whole year. They contrasted this with 
the rations they received at the beginning of their arrival in the camps, 
which were not only double what they were in 2001, but also included 
a variety of grains. During those days, refugees were able to sell some 
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of the rations to buy other food items, such as meat, milk, and veg-
etables, which are not provided by the camp administration.
A refugee diet, which should in theory include pulses and veg-
etables, in reality rarely contains these, and often results in high rates 
of malnutrition among women and children. In that first exploration 
in Dadaab in summer 2001, MSF reported a dramatic increase in the 
malnutrition rate of Somali refugee children—172 percent within a 
period of six months—due to a 35 percent decrease in the general food 
distribution in the camps.21 Only those few who receive remittances 
from the diaspora and those involved in petty trade/business are able 
to supplement the meager rations. “Meat and milk” (cad iyo caano), two 
words that together signify subsistence in the Somali language and 
originally comprised nomads’ main sources of nutrition, is a luxury 
very few refugees can afford. An interesting example illustrating the 
precariousness of life is the price of food items in Dadaab. A woman 
who sells some of her grain to buy milk for a baby would sell her 
maize for five Kenyan shillings per kilogram. However, one glass of 
milk costs ten Kenyan shillings.22 For a mother to provide this one 
glass for a small child, she would have to sell two kilos of the maize she 
received that morning, accounting for two-thirds of the main ration the 
child receives for two weeks.
Despite these difficulties, the dependency identified in Dadaab more 
closely resembles that discussed by Clarke, namely, loss of “social, 
political and economic coping systems,”23 rather than a “welfare men-
tality” or laziness. Refugees’ own perspectives highlight their lack of 
alternatives to distributed rations. As a matter of fact, they dwell on 
how employment and/or gaining one’s livelihood are desirable but 
impossible in the camp setting. Lack of material resources and employ-
ment prospects oblige most to rely solely on the bimonthly rations. For 
most refugees who are not involved in trade and who do not receive 
remittances, then, dependency on aid remains the only option. How-
ever, in spite of camp constraints, I found that refugees still desire and 
hope to be freed from the “beggarly” positions they occupy as depen-
dents on insufficient aid. One interviewee reported that she cleaned 
the premises of one of the NGOs for free for weeks, until some NGO 
staff took notice and a small remuneration was offered to her. This 
permitted her to supplement the meager distributed rations for herself 
and her four children. This woman demonstrated a tenacity to better 
her situation in an environment of scarce resources. All around the 
camps, one sees women selling small packets of sugar or spices to 
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make just enough to buy a glass of milk for the smallest children. Thus, 
as much as representations of camps always show people waiting for 
something, almost all expressed the urgent desire to provide for one’s 
family. This, in a nutshell, challenges the claim that refugees become 
dependent on aid because of an unwillingness to work for their suste-
nance.
III. Self-Perception: Refugee Identity
Another theme often coupled with the dependency syndrome is the 
loss of self-worth that may result from protracted refugee situations. 
My investigations in Dadaab strongly support this point. For many, 
the implications of being and being called “refugees” were often very 
negative. With a sense of grief, most refer to themselves as “qaxooti,”24 
a dreaded identity often associated with a degraded sense of self. Here 
are a few personal statements to that effect:
•  “A refugee is a fenced person.” (Hawa M. Ali)25
•  “The word ‘refugee’…in our heads means a weak individual; that 
is how we see ourselves. We ourselves don’t like it when we are 
called refugees… . But what can you do? It means a weak person, a 
person whose country was destroyed; it means a poor person, who 
has nothing, who is begging food that is handed down.” (Sa’ida M. 
Farah)
•  “A person who is sitting somewhere as if he/she was handicapped! 
There are no men who are employed in this block, who go to work 
in the morning and who gain a living. They are sitting around the 
house. They are unemployed. Nowhere to find jobs!” (Aliya S. 
Abdi)
•  “Refugee is poverty and hunger. A loser standing around, that is a 
refugee. I think of poverty, praying to Allah: ‘Allah, take us out of 
this misery,’ this suffering and hardship, carrying water on your 
bare back, searching for wood in the bushes, lack of milk for your 
children, unemployment, that is it.” (Hodan F. Abdirahman)
•  “A refugee is someone suffering. A refugee is someone who is in 
need. A refugee is someone who has nothing. That is how I inter-
pret the word ‘refugee.’ If we had any way of freeing ourselves, we 
would not be in this refugee camp tonight.” (Halima K. Bile)
•  “Refugee is not a pleasant word. When someone is told, ‘you are 
a refugee,’ it is a word that hurts. A refugee is a person who aban-
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doned his habitat, who lives in a territory that is not his, and who 
lives miserably and desperately, constantly worrying… . I mean you 
are seen as someone who is less than others, who is worst. So, as 
refugees, when we are told, ‘you are a refugee,’ we see it as if we are 
despised, weaker and less than other people. It depresses us every 
time the word is used. I see it as weak, someone who is not capable 
of anything. That is how I see the word ‘refugee.’ ” (Kaha A. Bihi)
Refugees frequently refer to the constraints on their freedom 
of movement in closed camps. People use metaphors drawn from 
nomadic animal herding, such as “fenced like livestock.” “Living in a 
prison where only the sky is open” is another way they express their 
condition. Fencing metaphors symbolize the barriers to the outside 
world, thus the barriers to escape the material deprivations intrinsic in 
camp life. Many refer to their hope to be freed from the conditions of 
“refugeehood.” To this end, both men and women often recite prayers. 
However, camp inhabitants, however much they despise the refugee 
persona (as illustrated by the images above), also assume this persona 
when recounting the harshness of camp life. As Harrell-Bond and oth-
ers have argued, refugees assume a “victimized” persona after spend-
ing a certain time in camps.26 In fact, the conditions existing in Dadaab 
render it easy to internalize this persona. Life in the Dadaab camps 
means being deprived of both material and physical security, and one 
discerns in refugees’ narratives a dilemma: on the one hand they are, 
objectively, refugees or “qaxooti;” on the other, they resent what the 
word connotes.
IV. Insecurity: Fenced in for the Enemy?
Instead of hospitality, refugees in limbo often experience exploita-
tion, extreme insecurity, and constant harassment, not only from local 
populations, but also from national authorities, whose policies fuel 
unfavorable sentiments toward the newcomers.27 Such a situation may 
partially stem from the hard conditions persisting in refugee-hosting 
areas. Local populations in these regions often end up more marginal-
ized than the refugees, who receive international humanitarian aid, 
which at least permits them to meet subsistence needs. When excluded 
from this aid, host populations tend to resent refugees and view the 
newcomers as “enemies” or competitors. Scarce resources, such as 
firewood and water, become contested when the sudden population 
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increase leads to high consumption of these limited resources.28 How-
ever, I argue that conflict with refugees in this situation should not be 
interpreted as hostility toward refugees per se. Rather, conflict in areas 
where water and pasture are scarce is often the norm. For example, 
in the Northeastern province of Kenya, where the Dadaab camps are 
located, local Somali-Kenyan populations historically and presently 
experience conflict due to a paucity of pasture and water. In such a 
context, for refugees to expect “hospitality” beyond the short-term is 
unrealistic, even if among a population of the same ethnic background. 
In an environment of scarcity, a “survival-of-the-fittest” mentality 
envelops all, with refugees often becoming victimized.
The pervasive insecurity in the Dadaab camps therefore illustrates 
the often-tense relationship between locals and refugees. Highlight-
ing the scale of this concern, UNHCR reported that, at the height of 
gender-based violence, there were 200 documented rapes in Dadaab 
in the year 1993. In the subsequent four years, the number of offi-
cially recorded rapes averaged between 70 and 105. But rapes again 
increased to 164 in 1998, fell to 71 in 1999, rose again to 108 in 2000, 
and dropped to 72 in 2001.29 Given the stigma attached to rape within 
the Somali culture, reported acts fall far short of the actual number of 
cases.30 Most of the rapes in Dadaab occur in the outskirts of the camps, 
as the depletion of firewood in this semi-arid region obliges women to 
walk further and further in search of sources of energy for cooking. 
UNHCR documented over 100 rapes from February to August 2002.31 
Most of the perpetrators are allegedly Somali nomads from the area, 
deegaanka,32 often referred to as “shiftas.”33
Another example of insecurity is the raiding of the camps by ban-
dits. These incursions coincide with bimonthly ration distributions or 
when material donations such as plastic bags are distributed to cover 
refugees’ makeshift houses. The bandits often come to grab any valu-
ables they might find, targeting particularly those suspected of own-
ing material goods or receiving remittances and fresh rations. It was 
reported that, on certain occasions, shiftas use the women to transport 
the looted rations and, when the task is done, rape and at times kill 
them on the outskirts of the camps.
One-woman interviewee referred to a rape she witnessed:
I saw it with my own eyes. She was caught and raped at the door, her 
pants34 pulled off, a girl of 15 years old, a gang, vagabonds, losers and 
shiftas, there you are, you are watching it, you scream, but you cannot 
Bildhaan  Vol. 5
26
free her from them, you are standing at your door. The conflict we fled, 
yesterday when NGOs (hay’adihii), assisted us, when we got settled, 
assisted us well, we thank them for it, we thank Allah for it… . we settled 
and our children started schools, when we would have done something 
for ourselves, an enemy was born (cadow baa dhulkii oo dhan ka dhaqaaqay). 
The other conflict might even have been better; at least we could get 
out, we could move around even if a bullet hits you. And now we miss 
that… . You just sit around (waaba saas u yuurur). (Ebla A. Hersi)
Additionally, the Kenyan police stationed in the camps to protect 
the vulnerable also reportedly commit violence against refugees. Con-
sequently, banditry, coupled with fear and distrust of those respon-
sible for their protection, renders the situation of refugees—especially 
women—doubly precarious. The security situation in Dadaab has 
improved only minimally, as is clear from the statistics above. The 
scope of this crisis is illustrated by Verdirame. In his assessment of 
the human rights abuses in Kenyan camps, he accuses the UNHCR of 
“administering the camps in ways which often appear to be blatant 
disregard of international human rights standards.”35
A comparison of the incidents of rape in Dadaab, with a population 
of 130,000, to those reported in 2002 for Mogadishu, the most danger-
ous and violent city in Somalia for the past decade, with a population 
of over one million, illustrates the magnitude of insecurity prevailing 
in Dadaab. A Somali human rights group active in Mogadishu, the Dr. 
Ismael Jumale Human Rights Centre (DIJHRC), documented 32 rape 
cases in Mogadishu for 2002.36 Though this number is probably a gross 
underestimation of the actual number of rapes committed by militias 
in Mogadishu, it nevertheless underscores the seriousness of insecurity 
faced by women in Dadaab camps. Furthermore, the high incidence of 
violence in Dadaab is also a clear indication of the failure of the host 
state to protect refugees in its territory.
V. Host State and Refugee Crisis
A host state plays a crucial role in the reception of refugees and the 
type of settlement offered to them: either integration with the host 
population or existing in limbo in peripheral regions. Geopolitics is 
often key to these decisions. For example, Western nations encouraged 
refugees from the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War, whereas, follow-
ing the end of the East-West divide, the reception of refugees from the 
Balkan wars was tepid at best. Moreover, regional conflicts can encour-
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age or discourage refugee flows from neighboring countries; that is, 
the masses on the move become a tool to discredit the other side or 
to avoid a spillover of political turmoil in neighboring countries. The 
latter is especially the case when people in the host state include some 
of the same ethnic group(s) as the refugees. For instance, neighboring 
countries with historical border disputes, such as Somalia and Ethio-
pia, each encouraged refugees from the other side in the 1970s and 
80s, whereas Kenya, with the collapse of Somalia in 1991, was hostile 
to the influx. In the latter case, the Kenyan Government’s encampment 
policies are closely tied to the fear that the new arrivals could endan-
ger political order in the country. Containment of refugees in closed 
camps, then, facilitates the monitoring of undesirable activities.
A host state’s policies toward a refugee crisis are also partially dic-
tated by the pressures it experiences from the Western powers, which 
control the purses of “aid” and “loans.” Kenya, for instance, already 
facing reduction of aid due to its human rights record, used the Somali 
refugee crisis to negotiate for a continuation of international aid: “On 
the one hand, the presence of large numbers of Somali refugees in 
Kenya was held as evidence of Kenya’s improved human rights record. 
On the other, Kenyan authorities threatened to return these refugees 
forcibly if a renewal of aid was not forthcoming.”37 Host governments, 
in addition, influence the perceptions of the wider host population. 
The scapegoating of refugees as responsible for all the social and eco-
nomic ills (which often predate the arrival of refugees) compounds the 
resentment toward an already disfranchised populace construed as 
foreign and undesirable.38 The situation of Somali refugees in Kenyan 
camps is, therefore, intrinsically tied to the colonially inherited border 
disputes between post-independence Somalia and Kenya, and to the 
marginal position Somali-Kenyans occupy within the Kenyan state.
Finding solutions to protracted refugee situations, such as those 
in the Dadaab camps, remains a challenge for the international com-
munity. However, narrow definitions of the best course of action to 
address the crisis often result in the perpetuation of an untenable con-
dition for millions.
VI. Durable Solutions: 
Prospects of Integration, Resettlement, and Repatriation
Most refugees in Dadaab are familiar with the three preferred solutions 
to refugee crises as stipulated by the international refugee regime: inte-
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gration into the host society, resettlement in a third country, or repa-
triation to the country of origin. Of the 130 refugees who participated 
in conversations with Adelman and Abdi during a 2003 CARE Canada 
consultancy field trip in Dadaab, the majority reiterated the need to 
implement one of these options to terminate their encampment.39 How-
ever, none of these potential solutions have yet been implemented. On 
the contrary, the camp life has assumed a degree of permanence.
As the comments about the Kenyan Government’s treatment of 
Somali refugees illustrate, integration into the host country has not 
been tried as a viable option. This is because of the assumption that 
the policy would immediately be met by very vocal opposition from 
landless locals. Serious economic and political challenges confronting 
Kenyans eliminate any possibility for the provision of land to refugees 
or the acceptance of integrating them. Furthermore, Kenya’s reluctance 
to pass a refugee bill that has been under discussion for years now, 
despite the fact that it has been hosting very large numbers of Somali 
and Sudanese refugees from the 1980s onward, testifies to its ambiva-
lence. Consequently, refugees in Kenya still lack any legal recognition 
within the Kenyan political system, despite Kenya’s ratification of the 
refugee conventions of both the U.N. and the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU). All responsibility then falls on the UNHCR.
If integration is not a viable alternative, both resettlement and repa-
triation have also remained elusive for Somali refugees in Dadaab 
camps. The percentage of resettled persons worldwide amounts to 
a dismally small number. Of the more than twenty million persons 
dispersed around the world in 2002, 55,500 (or just about 0.3 percent) 
were resettled in a third country.40 The numbers of Somali refugees 
resettled by traditional refugee-receiving countries, such as Canada, 
the United States, and Australia, have further diminished since the ter-
rorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States. For example, 
the 2002 UNHCR Annual Statistical Report shows that the number of 
resettled Somalis for that year was 640: 295 went to the U.S., 159 to 
New Zealand, 116 to Canada, and smaller numbers to the Netherlands, 
Norway, and Sweden.41 The current rhetoric on “terrorism” that domi-
nates the immigration policies of most Western nations, and the bomb-
ing incidents in Kenya in which Somalis were implicated, account for 
this decrease. These dismal numbers highlight the limited opportuni-
ties for resettlement that exist for refugees in general, and particularly 
for Somali Muslims, since the September 11, 2001, attacks.42 This also 
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underscores the problematic nature of this option as a solution to end 
the state of limbo in which large numbers of refugees find themselves.
Repatriation has also remained impossible for most in Dadaab. 
Herein, however, lies a dilemma. Refugees and UNHCR differ on the 
feasibility of this option. Only a small percentage of the thousands in 
Dadaab who in 2001 signed up with the UNHCR for voluntary repa-
triation have so far returned, mainly to the Northeastern region of 
Somalia. This is in stark contrast to Somali refugees in camps in Ethio-
pia, the majority having already repatriated to the Northwest. The 
UNHCR reports that 220 refugees were repatriated from the Dadaab 
camps in 2002 and about 500 in 2003.43 The UNHCR also claims that 
funding constraints hinder its ability to repatriate the Somali refugees 
in Dadaab. Adelman and Abdi’s consultations with refugee groups 
in Dadaab revealed an overwhelming preference for voluntary repa-
triation, provided there is some financial assistance to restart life.44 
Despite the fact that many refugees in Dadaab come from minority kin 
groups and/or rural backgrounds in the southern regions of Somalia, 
most expressed a willingness to repatriate to other regions, mainly in 
the northeast and northwest of Somalia, if provided with some finan-
cial assistance to do so. Many insisted that they are very aware of the 
material and physical insecurities existing in many parts of Somalia. 
However, they also argued that worse material and physical circum-
stances persist in the Dadaab camps. They cited the Somali proverb, 
“laba kala daran mid dooro” (choose the least of two evils). Regardless of 
the risks involved in life in Somalia, refugees argue that they would at 
least have freedom of movement and the possibility to seek employ-
ment. But with diminishing funding for all other aspects of administer-
ing the camps, UNHCR claims that it is unable to fulfill the desires of 
thousands of refugees.
Adelman et al. proposed an alternative to the costly yet inadequate 
care and maintenance that have been provided to those in Dadaab for 
the last twelve years. This proposal stresses that repatriation for most 
Somali refugees should seriously be considered:
We recommend that a meeting be held of donors so that they pledge to 
give the same monies they now give for camp operations over the next 
five years, but an appropriate committee of international agencies be 
given authority to use those guarantees to obtain present funding for 
repatriation in flexible ways to find the various durable solutions for the 
different groups of refugees and different choices refugees make. The 
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refugees will return, but with conditions, conditions that deal with their 
material security and security of education for their children.45
This proposal emphasized giving refugees real choices. Here, it is 
important to highlight that resettlement is not a viable choice for most 
refugees. This will, however, be encouraged for small groups of refu-
gees, such as some minority groups who feel they cannot return to 
Somalia, vulnerable women and their children, and so on. As Kumin 
argued in her address at the 2003 Group of 78 (G78) Annual Policy 
Conference in Ottawa, options like the one proposed here actually fit 
well with the current High Commissioner’s proposed “Convention 
Plus.” Consistent with Adelman and Abdi’s insistence on avoiding 
the narrowly defined mantra of “durable solutions,” Convention Plus 
is about “develop[ing] new tools for today’s problems.” These tools 
include:
[C]omprehensive plans of action to ensure more effective and predict-
able responses to mass influx or to protracted refugee situations; devel-
opment assistance targeted to achieve more equitable burden-sharing 
and to promote self-reliance of refugees and returnees; multilateral com-
mitments for resettlement of refugees; and the delineation of roles and 
responsibilities of countries of origin, transit and destination. The under-
lying premise is that specific commitments will lend themselves better to 
binding agreements than broad policy exhortations.46
Durable solutions as they stand now are no more than exhortations, 
often amounting to no commitment from the international commu-
nity. Exploring other options and freeing refugees from “imaginary” 
solutions for their plight should be at the top of the agenda of refugee-
assisting organizations. Also, these options should include an interna-
tional concerted effort to contribute to peace-building initiatives in the 
refugee-producing regions, which will go far in expediting the end of 
the miserable condition of uncertainty.
VII. Conclusion
This analysis has attempted to highlight the constraints refugees in 
limbo face in their protracted camp life. It was argued that dependency 
on aid in Dadaab remains the main option open to most refugees, not 
because of lack of initiative to provide for one’s family, but rather due to 
the absence of alternative means of livelihood for the majority. In addi-
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tion, research clearly indicates that the refugees’ sense of self-worth 
was affected by their status. “Refugee” identity is painted as undesir-
able and even dreaded. Moreover, violence, especially gender violence, 
remains epidemic in Dadaab, and insecurity remains a top concern for 
all. With Dadaab in its second decade of existence and world attention 
currently focused on the war on “terrorism” and the war in Iraq, secur-
ing funding for refugees in protracted situations in peripheral regions 
is becoming extremely hard for international organizations.
Given the grim picture painted by these findings, it is paramount 
that states that are signatories to the U.N. covenants on human rights 
endorse national legislation for the rights of refugees in agreement 
with international laws. This would certainly go a long way toward 
reducing the desperately protracted situations of refugees in many 
parts of the world. Even if governments are ultimately responsible for 
settlement policies (and not international organizations, which have 
“no army or access to coercive power to act on behalf of refugees”47), 
international organizations can and should do more to maximize their 
presence in host countries. Regrettably, once the emergency phase 
passes, inertia of the international humanitarian bodies administer-
ing the camps and the international community’s will to find solu-
tions sets in. Yet the scholarly literature provides us with enough case 
studies and lessons to avoid repeating the same old scenarios when 
responding to future crises: the creation of camps as temporary solutions. 
On the contrary, camps turned into semi-permanent settlements create 
despair and insecurity. In other words, the long-term consequences 
of closed camps—where people are segregated from the general host 
population, where freedom of movement is dramatically curtailed, 
where a state resembling a “total institution” prevails, and where refu-
gees are in limbo in all aspects of daily life—create a host of new 
and disabling problems. The choice seems to be stark: either condemn 
human beings who have already been dealt a cruel hand to a life bereft 
of adequate sustenance and dignity or act promptly and competently 
to explore other alternatives that effectively address protracted refugee 
situations. Relevant national governments, international organizations, 
and the larger global community are in a position to make that choice.
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